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THE INHERITANCE OF INEQUALITY: 
HUKOU AND RELATED BARRIERS TO COMPULSORY 
EDUCATION FOR CHINA’S MIGRANT CHILDREN 
Jessica L. Montgomery†      
Abstract: The hukou system in China uses residency permits to divide Chinese 
citizens into urban and rural dwellers.  A person’s hukou status determines his or her 
access to state services.  Under normal circumstances, a person with a rural hukou status 
is not eligible for state services in urban areas, and vice versa.  Because hukou is 
primarily inherited from one’s parents at the time of birth, children born in urban areas to 
parents with rural hukou are similarly designated as rural hukou holders.  As a result, 
children living in cities with rural hukou are ineligible for enrollment in urban public 
schools even if they were born within the district.  This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that a massive number of people are engaged in rural-urban migration in China each 
year.  The central government has promulgated numerous laws and regulations in an 
attempt to grant these migrant children free access to urban public schools, but most local 
governments have been hesitant to implement the changes.  Further, as a prerequisite to 
enrollment, urban public schools commonly require excessive amounts of documentation 
and charge expensive fees that make public education inaccessible to migrant families.  
This comment argues that to fix the current problems with hukou and educational access, 
the central government needs to clarify the responsibilities of local governments in 
administrating public education and should devote more funding to urban and rural 
schools.  Both of these measures would encourage local officials to comply with existing 
education laws regarding migrant children.  Additionally, the central government must 
encourage stricter enforcement of relevant laws in order to incentivize local compliance.  
Making these changes will have long-term political and economic benefits for China 
because educating this large group of children can soothe social tensions in cities, lessen 
income inequality, and facilitate China’s transition to a service-based economy.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s rapid urbanization and robust economic growth have spurred 
a massive internal migration from rural villages to urban centers.  Rural 
residents move to cities to take advantage of diverse employment 
opportunities, higher wages, and higher standards of living.  However, rural 
migrants face a serious institutional barrier upon their arrival:  the hukou 
system.  The hukou system, sometimes referred to as “household 
registration,” separates Chinese citizens into urban and rural residents—a 
distinction that carries social, economic, and political implications.1 
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China implemented its modern hukou system in the 1950s to carry out 
two main functions:  controlling rural-urban migration and determining 
access to social services. 2   It also serves an administrative purpose by 
providing the government with census-like information that can be used for 
various social and political objectives.3  The hukou system has undergone 
many reforms since its inception,4 but the system still serves these same 
basic purposes.  The People’s Republic of China established the modern 
hukou system during a time when cooperative living was the norm and the 
state controlled all aspects of industry and commerce.5  At the height of 
central planning, the hukou system played an important and sensible role in 
controlling the population’s mobility.6  However, as a result of the more 
market-oriented policies China has embraced in the past several decades, the 
hukou system, which continues to control mobility and opportunity for urban 
and rural residents,7 is increasingly out of touch with the country’s current 
sociopolitical structure.  
The hukou system has been accused of many things:  creating a rural-
urban apartheid, building cities with invisible walls, and discriminating 
against the same workers who made China’s economic boom possible.8  
Many criticisms of the hukou system are based on its effects on access to 
social services, such as education.  As a result of this relationship, the large 
populations of rural migrant children living in Chinese cities without urban 
hukou are effectively shut out of the public school system with few other 
viable options. 9   This comment will examine the legal framework 
surrounding the education of rural hukou-holding children living in China’s 
cities (hereafter referred to as “migrant children”) and set forth suggestions 
for fixing the current inequity in compulsory education.   
The hukou system is not applied evenhandedly across China.  After 
years of reforms, local governments now exercise significant discretion over 
                                                      
2
 Id. at 358. 
3
 Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China:  
Processes and Changes, 160 CHINA Q. 818, 818-19 (1999), available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3526968.  
4
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6
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9
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hukou policy, leading certain cities to adopt differing standards to acquire 
urban hukou.10  It is important to keep this in mind because although this 
comment makes generalizations about hukou policy and its implications, 
policies across China differ, especially as they relate to education and 
treatment of migrant children.  
Growing decentralization of school administration has compromised 
national legislative measures to improve educational access to migrant 
children.  Although the central government revised the Compulsory 
Education Act in 2006 to ensure rural migrant children free access to 
compulsory education (encompassing six years of primary and three years of 
junior secondary education) in state schools, wide-scale demolition of 
private schools continues while migrant children are still turned away from 
the state school system in large numbers.11  It is in China’s economic and 
political interest to incorporate migrant children into the state’s compulsory 
education system, but the central government must overcome the barriers 
that decentralization presents in order to realize this goal.   
Migrant workers already feel mistreated by the state, resulting in 
social unrest that can be witnessed across China. 12   If the government 
continues to deny educational opportunities to migrant children, it is likely 
to fuel further social turmoil.  Social unrest among migrant workers also 
exists because China is moving away from an economy based on low-cost 
manufacturing.  This transition is partially due to skyrocketing 
manufacturing costs, which are fueled by labor shortages and demands for 
higher wages to offset rapid increases in food and property prices.13  This 
rise in manufacturing costs has already led some factories to relocate to 
lower-wage countries.14  The Chinese government itself accedes that the 
country is moving toward a service-based economy. 15   Connecting the 
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 Li Mu, China May Develop Service Economy in 5 Years, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 9, 2010, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7161177.html (“China's service sector accounted for 
a 42.6 percent share of China's GDP in the first half of this year, representing a 1.3 percent increase.  The 
growth is expected to continue, and it will surpass the industry sector share by 2015, the last year of 
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan.”).  
594 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 3 
concepts of education and economic transition, a recent World Bank report 
stated:  “Producing services tends to require relatively less natural capital 
and more human capital than producing agricultural or industrial goods.  As 
a result demand has grown for more educated workers, prompting countries 
to invest more in education—an overall benefit to their people.”16  China’s 
economy will benefit when it incorporates migrant children into the state 
school system.  It will be able to compete internationally as a service-based 
economy, and it will allocate fewer resources to public security to handle 
social unrest stemming from the grievances of migrant workers.  
Part II of this comment discusses three issues:  1) a brief overview of 
the hukou system in China, 2) the significance of hukou policy and rural-
urban migration, and 3) the hardships migrant workers and their children 
face trying to access social services in the cities where they have moved.  
Part III examines the legal and social frameworks surrounding education in 
China and makes the case that the current legal and social frameworks do 
not adequately protect migrant children’s rights to attend urban public 
schools.  Part IV argues that fully incorporating migrant children into the 
state school system will bring political and economic benefits to China.  
Finally, Part V details the steps that the central and local governments should 
take to ensure access to state schools for migrant children.  These steps 
include introducing more detailed rules on enrollment of migrant children, 
stepping up enforcement of existing education laws, and boosting education 
spending in rural and urban areas.  
II. HUKOU POLICY IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE ENGAGED IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND BECAUSE IT 
DETERMINES ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES  
This Part explains the significance of hukou policy in modern China 
as it relates to migrant children and argues that it is unreasonably difficult 
for migrant children to access state education in the cities where they live.  
Rural-urban migration is a common undertaking in modern China.  The 
McKinsey Global Institute, which collects global demographic statistics, 
estimates that between 1990 and 2005, 103 million Chinese people migrated 
from rural to urban areas.17  In large eastern cities like Beijing and Shanghai, 
the migrant work force is estimated to make up over one quarter of the 
                                                      
16
 TATYANA P. SOUBBOTINA, BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH 52 (The World Bank eds., 2d ed. 2004), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/beyond.htm.  
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 McKinsey & Co., Preparing for China's Urban Billion 18 (2009), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Urbanization/Preparing_for_urban_billion_in_China.  
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population. 18   Some cities in the southern Pearl River Delta region, 
commonly known as “the world’s factory,” have even larger populations of 
migrant workers.  In 2005, the mayor of Dongguan suggested that the city 
had close to 10 million migrant workers, in contrast to the 1.7 million local 
residents recorded by an earlier census.19  The National Statistics Bureau 
reported that at the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 million rural 
migrant workers.20  Additionally, recent reports from the National Bureau of 
Statistics show that urban dwellers account for 51.27% of China’s 
population, showing that this trend of urbanization is still increasing. 21  
Perhaps more important, today migrant workers stay for longer periods of 
time in the cities where they have moved.22  Also, 60% of migrant workers 
in China now move with their children.23  In Henan, China’s second-most 
populated province, the number of migrant children increased by roughly 
25% each year from 2000 to 2006.24   
There are many reasons why migrant workers choose to move away 
from their hometowns, but some reasons are more pervasive than others.  
Many migrant workers associate their rural hometowns with poverty and 
backwardness, seeing cities as gateways to more modern and privileged 
lifestyles.25  Today’s migrant workers tend to be younger and better educated 
than those who stay behind in rural areas.26  The process of migrating from 
rural to urban centers in China is called chuqu (literally translated as “going 
out”).27  Many migrant workers decide to engage in chuqu because there are 
relatively few opportunities for young people in rural China. 28   Often, 
migrant workers move to a location after hearing about job openings from 
friends, relatives, or fellow villagers.29  Today, migrant workers are typically 
found in several industries:  manufacturing, food service, delivery service, 
housecleaning, childcare, garbage collection, personal hygiene, and 
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 LESLIE CHANG, FACTORY GIRLS 11-12. 
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 Id. at 20. 
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 China Rural Migrant Workers Number Nearly 230 Million, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 24, 
2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6929156.html.  
21
 Jeremy Page, Bob Davis, & James Areddy, China Turns Predominately Urban, WALL ST. J. ASIA, 
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 China's 'Floating Population' Exceeds 221 Mln, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2011, 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7303707.html. 
23
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24
 The Children of Migrant Workers in China, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, May 8, 2009, available at 
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25
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26
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 Id. at 11.  
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 Id. at 12.  
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prostitution. 30   Though the cities provide many more opportunities for 
migrant workers, the work is often hard, the wages are frequently below 
minimum wage, and it is not uncommon for work shifts to push well beyond 
legal limits.31 
A. The Hukou System Creates Three Distinct Social Classes and 
Provides Unequal Access to Education  
This Section briefly explains the structure and implications of hukou 
policy in China, focusing on its relation to educational access.  Two 
components determine a person’s hukou classification:  place of hukou 
registration (“hukou suozaidi”) and type of hukou registration (“hukou 
leibie”).32   The place of hukou registration controls a person’s rights to 
engage in certain economic activities in an area and is based on a person’s 
permanent place of residence (urban or rural).33  An individual’s type of 
hukou registration, however, does not depend on a person’s place of 
residence—instead it is inherited, typically from one’s parents.34  The type of 
hukou registration a person has, either agricultural or non-agricultural, 
determines one’s socioeconomic eligibility within the state.35  A person must 
seek government approval to change his or her hukou classification; 
however, strict government policies and quotas micromanage urban-rural 
migration and greatly complicate any change in status.36  
The hukou system essentially creates three tiers of society in Chinese 
cities.  The first tier is comprised of those with full urban hukou.37  The 
second tier includes people who have managed to acquire urban residency 
by changing their place of hukou (hukou suozaidi), but still retain their rural 
hukou type (hukou leibie).38  This group is commonly referred to as having 
“mixed status.”  The third tier is occupied by those with full rural hukou.39  
This third group is often called China’s “floating population.”40   
                                                      
30
 Id. 
31
 CHANG, supra note 18, at 11.  
32
 Chan and Zhang, supra note 3, at 821-26.  
33
 Id. at 821-22. 
34
 Id. at 822. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. at 823, 827-29 
37
 DONALD TREIMAN & ZHUONI ZHANG, SOCIAL ORIGINS, HUKOU, CONVERSION, AND THE 
WELLBEING OF URBAN RESIDENTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 4 (Cal. Center for Population Research, 
2011), available at http://www.pop.upenn.edu/sites/www.pop.upenn.edu/files/Zhang_Treiman_0.pdf. 
38
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The “floating population” is primarily comprised of uneducated low-
income workers,41 but its broad definition may also encompass those with 
college degrees who have moved away from their home provinces in search 
of white-collar work.  The mixed population still faces institutional hukou-
based barriers, but generally has more advantages because of its local 
residency rights than those with full rural hukou.42  Scholars Donald Treiman 
and Zhuoni Zhang note that “[a]ccess to public schools, health care, and 
certain types of housing, jobs, and insurance are either restricted to local 
residents or are more limited and more expensive for those lacking local 
registration, which usually is impossible to obtain without obtaining an 
urban [hukou].”43  This comment will use the term “rural hukou” to describe 
those in the second and third tiers.   
 Under normal circumstances, children inherit their hukou 
classifications from their parents at their time of birth, and migrant parents 
are often living in cities without the proper urban hukou necessary for access 
to state services such as health care and education.44  Once born with rural 
hukou classification, these migrant children will similarly face problems 
accessing state services in urban areas.  To frame the scale of this issue, it is 
estimated that approximately 19 million migrant children are currently living 
in China’s cities.45  A journalist reporting on migrant children noted:   
Chinese children are entitled to a state education, but not all of 
them get one.  And the tens of millions born to migrant workers 
. . . are among the most vulnerable, owing to a registration 
system that divides the country’s citizens into rural and urban 
dwellers, and dictates their rights accordingly.46   
Migrant children face difficulties accessing state education for several 
reasons.  Urban public schools often receive no additional funding from the 
central government for these children, so many of them are turned away 
even if their parents can afford to pay the exorbitant “donations” some 
schools charge to admit migrant children who meet the designated criteria.47  
                                                      
41
 Education Level of Young Chinese Migrant Workers "Significantly Raised,” XINHUA, Dec. 9, 
2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/09/c_131181582.htm.  
42
 TREIMAN & ZHANG, supra note 37, at 5. 
43
 Id. at 8. 
44
 Tania Branigan, Millions of Chinese Rural Migrants Denied Education for Their Children, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/15/china-migrant-workers-
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45
 Id.  
46
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Many migrant families turn to private schools to educate their children, but 
local governments consistently demolish these institutions in the name of 
urban development.48 
B. Current Policy Makes it Difficult for Rural Migrant Workers and 
Their Children to Obtain Urban Hukou Status and to Access Social 
Services in Cities 
A person needs to seek government approval to change his or her 
place and type of hukou registration.49  Hukou reforms over the past two 
decades have resulted in local governments asserting more control over 
hukou administration and management.50  Local governments now have a 
high degree of control over hukou criteria in their jurisdictions, both in terms 
of the type and number of people accepted.51  As a result, local governments 
in urban areas tend to give preferential treatment to those applicants who can 
meet certain levels of wealth or education.52  This makes sense on some 
level—with excess money to invest and marketable human capital, the 
educated rich would constitute valuable economic assets to any city.  
However, the educated rich do not tend to work in manufacturing, childcare, 
construction, sanitation, or food service, industries vital to the functioning of 
any modern Chinese city.  Instead, these jobs fall to migrant workers.53 
The process of transferring one’s type of registration (hukou leibie) 
from agricultural to non-agricultural is referred to as nongzhuanfei and 
determines one’s entitlement status in a given locality.54  Nongzhuanfei is 
simply unattainable for most migrant workers because they cannot live up to 
the various official and unofficial standards that local governments 
promulgate, including requirements that applicants pay fees, present a 
multitude of documents, and use guanxi (personal connections one can draw 
upon for favors), which many migrant workers do not have.55  While some 
migrant workers receive temporary residency, this classification typically 
does not in itself grant access to social services such as education. 56  
According to a 2007 study by Amnesty International that examined 
                                                      
48
 Id. 
49
 Chan & Zhang, supra note 3, at 823.  
50
 Chan, supra note 1, at 361.  
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 CHANG, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
54
 Chan & Zhang, supra note 3, at 822-24.  
55
 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNAL MIGRANTS: DISCRIMINATION AND ABUSE.  THE HUMAN 
COST OF AN ECONOMIC ‘MIRACLE,’ § II, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/00
8/2007/en /c28868de-d3af-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/asa170082007en.html. 
56
 Id. §VII.   
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eligibility standards in localities across China, “the vast majority of internal 
migrants are unable to obtain permanent urban hukou.”57   
Again, children’s hukou designations do not stem from their city of birth, 
but rather from their parents’ statuses,58 which means that the children of 
migrant workers also lack access to crucial social services such as education.  
Numbers released in 2010 by the Beijing Bureau of Statistics revealed that 
240,000 children between ages 6-14 were living in Beijing without 
permanent residency, almost a 20% increase from numbers collected in 
2000. 59   Despite the measures that have been taken to improve this 
population’s access to urban public schools, the problem continues to exist.  
C. Children with Rural Hukou Registration Face Tremendous Challenges 
in Accessing State Education in the Cities Where They Live 
Numerous laws and State Council directives (the State Council is an 
executive body of the government) command local governments to educate 
the migrant children living within their jurisdictions. 60   However, these 
commands lack adequate funding, and local governments have interpreted 
them in ways that minimize their responsibility to educate migrant 
children.61  Many of these laws and directives broadly state that migrant 
children should not pay additional fees to attend urban public schools, but 
these statements have not prompted much on-the-ground improvement.62  
Despite the fact that the Compulsory Education Law seems to guarantee free 
compulsory education to all school-age children in China,63 in 2004 tuition 
and miscellaneous fees made up 18.59% of total expenditures on education 
in the country.64  This burden tends to fall the hardest on migrant children.65  
At one time, public schools in Shandong province charged students without 
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 Id.  
58
 Id.  
59
 Schools for Migrant Workers’ Children Torn Down, CHINA DAILY WEIBO BUZZ, Aug. 19 2011, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-08/19/content_13150732.htm.  
60
 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION 
SYSTEM:  SUSTAINED REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA’S RURAL MIGRANTS 4-7 (2005), available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/hukou.pdf.   
61
 Id. at 7.  
62
 HAN JIALING, EDUCATION FOR MIGRANT CHILDREN IN CHINA 9 (2009), available at http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/CHNgmrpap09.pdf.  
63
 Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2006, effective Sept. 
1, 2006), art. 2, (2006) (China) (though after the 2006 amendments to the Compulsory Education Act, these 
numbers could potentially have improved).   
64
 EMILY C. HANNUM, JERE BEHRMAN, MEIYAN WANG, & JIHONG LIU, EDUCATION IN THE REFORM 
ERA 41 (2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/emily_hannum/10. 
65
 Branigan, supra note 9.  
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local hukou registration 300 to 500 yuan (approximately $50-80 United 
States dollars “USD”) per semester in additional fees, not including fees 
charged to the entire student body.66  In 2011, the average monthly salary of 
a migrant worker was approximately 1,690 yuan (approximately $260 USD) 
per month, 67  a 19% increase from numbers reported in 2009. 68   While 
schools in some large cities like Beijing and Chongqing have scaled back the 
additional fees required to admit migrant children,69 financial requisites for 
admission still tend to be higher for migrant children.70   
Because local governments typically do not receive additional funding 
from the central government to accommodate these children, they often lack 
the infrastructure and resources to educate all the school-age children living 
in their jurisdictions.71  In an attempt to make up for budget shortfalls, some 
administrators charge illicit “donations” to admit migrant children, which 
the typical migrant family cannot afford.72   
Apart from up-front fees, other factors make public education 
inaccessible to many migrant families.  Guanxi (personal connections) are 
often necessary for admittance, and many migrant workers lack the social 
networks and financial capacity to establish the guanxi needed to get their 
children enrolled.73  In addition, many urban public schools require parents 
to provide certain documents (typically known as the “five key government-
issued documents” or the “five certificates”), including formal employment 
contracts (or employment certificates) and temporary residence permits, as a 
prerequisite to enrollment.74  This requirement does not take into account the 
practical realities of life as a migrant worker.  Many migrant parents work in 
informal environments where labor contracts are not used.75  In 2004, only 
an estimated 21% of migrant workers had labor contracts with their 
employers.76  While new legislation in 2007 put more pressure on employers 
to use labor contracts, this remains a serious problem facing migrant workers 
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 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 60, at 8.  
67
 Li Yancheng, Average Monthly Income of Migrant Workers Reaches 1,690 Yuan, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE, Mar. 23, 2011, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7329296.html. 
68
 Id.  
69
 HAN, supra note 62, at 10.  
70
 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 60, at 8.  
71
 Id.  
72
 Id.  
73
 Id.  
74
 Id.; Branigan, supra note 9; See also HAN, supra note 62, at 6-7 (discussing the “five certificate 
system” and its administration).   
75
 Branigan, supra note 9; Mudie, supra note 11.  
76
 Andrew Scheineson, China’s Internal Migrants, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, May 14, 2009, 
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today.77  Also, studies indicate that approximately one-third of the migrant 
worker population is self-employed.78  Thus, an overwhelming majority of 
the migrant workforce lacks the necessary documentation to enroll their 
children in urban public schools.   
D. Private Schools for Migrant Children Exist but Often Provide Sub-Par 
Education and Frequently Face Demolition by Local Governments 
Private schools for migrant children have been established in many 
Chinese cities but continue to face significant problems.79  First, they must 
charge tuition in order to operate, and sometimes charge as much as state 
schools for enrollment.80  In early 2009, Tangsi Primary School, a migrant 
school in Shanghai, charged 550 yuan (approximately $95 USD) per 
semester for books and tuition. 81   As previously stated, most migrant 
workers have limited finances and cannot afford to pay that high of tuition.  
Second, the state frequently demolishes these schools in the name of urban 
development, lack of accreditation, or health or safety violations.82  This 
interrupts the students’ educational trajectories and again sends them 
searching for alternative educational opportunities. 83   Third, while some 
private migrant schools provide a quality education, many are low-quality 
institutions merely created to turn a profit off migrant workers with limited 
options and are staffed by inexperienced teachers.84   
Some migrant children have benefitted from private schools, such as 
in Shanghai where the government has increasingly supported these 
institutions with periodic appropriations and legal protections.85  However, 
the existence of private institutions does not and should not alleviate the 
government’s responsibility to provide free and accessible compulsory 
education to all Chinese children.   
Despite the relative success of migrant schools in Shanghai, these 
successes are not shared across the country.  Private schools for migrant 
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children often employ unlicensed teachers and are located in undesirable and 
potentially dangerous locations like factory buildings, old apartments, and 
warehouses.86  Migrant schools across the country still face the threat of 
random and arbitrary demolitions.87  While local governments frequently 
claim that demolitions will be accompanied by wider inclusion of migrant 
children in state schools, limited capacity, limited funding, and the inability 
of migrant parents to gather the “five certificates” necessary for enrollment 
prevent these promises from being fully realized.88 
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK SURROUNDING THE PROVISION OF 
STATE EDUCATION IN CHINA FAILS TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF 
MIGRANT CHILDREN  
 This Part discusses the current legal framework surrounding 
compulsory education in China and attempts to explain why it falls short of 
being effective.  Several Chinese laws and regulations, on their face, seem to 
guarantee free compulsory education to all Chinese children.89  Yet a close 
inspection of the legal framework shows a more complex picture.  Five main 
sources of law affect compulsory education in China:  the Constitution, the 
Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Education Law”), State 
Council directives, the Compulsory Education Act (“CEA”), and various 
local regulations.  These sources of law will be discussed in turn.  This Part 
also argues that integrating migrant children into the state school system will 
have several positive effects, many of which align with the country’s own 
stated policy goals.   
The Chinese Constitution addresses the provision of education, 
though it does so in vague terms.90  Article 46 establishes that “[c]itizens of 
the People's Republic of China have the duty as well as the right to receive 
education.”91   
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The Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the 
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) in 1985, gives a clearer picture of how 
the educational system is to be managed in practice.92  It provides that the 
State Council and local governments should guide and administer education 
with a suitable division of responsibilities.93  The result is that the State 
Council is responsible for the overall planning, coordination, and 
management of education while local administrative departments of 
education take responsibility for on-the-ground educational activities in their 
respective regions.94   
The Ministry of Education, a department within the State Council, is 
the highest administrative educational body in China and is responsible for 
guiding the compulsory education system.95  More specifically, the Ministry 
of Education manages educational funds and inspects and evaluates 
compulsory education programs. 96   However, following the trend of 
decentralization embodied by the Education Law, local governments largely 
manage the administration of compulsory education.97  Decentralization of 
the administration and financing of education has increased extra-budgetary 
spending because it allows local governments to use non-traditional 
resources like student fees, though these gains have been largely confined to 
urban areas where there is more wealth. 98   In line with this increase, 
government appropriations for compulsory education have also decreased 
significantly since the early 1990s, dropping over 20% between 1991 and 
2004.99  Though decentralization may effectively boost education spending 
in certain pockets of the country, it has also allowed local governments to 
counteract the central government’s policy goals with few consequences.  As 
discussed below, decentralization presents one of the most significant 
obstacles to an equitable application of education laws to migrant children 
because it gives local governments too much unchecked discretion.100   
While the Constitution and the Education Law make general 
statements about the administration and availability of education, State 
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Council directives, the CEA, and local regulations more specifically detail 
the rights of children and the responsibilities of administrators.  These three 
sources of law are discussed in more detail below.  
A. State Council Directives Issued Over the Past Decade Have 
Emphasized the Importance of Providing Education to Migrant 
Children 
The State Council is the highest executive organ of state power in 
China and has the power to carry out the principles and policies of the 
Communist Party, effectuate laws and regulations adopted by the NPC, and 
handle issues such as finance and education.101  The State Council can issue 
directives that have compulsory effects similar to laws adopted by the 
NPC.102  The State Council and the ministries, commissions, and bureaus 
subordinate to it have the power to issue laws, regulations, and orders that 
are characterized as legislative in nature.103  Administrative agencies under 
the State Council, such as the Ministry of Education, are authorized to 
implement rules that are necessary for them to carry out their responsibilities 
in their designated areas.104 
 The State Council has issued three relevant directives in the past 
several years:  the “Decision on Reforming and Developing Elementary 
Education” in 2001, “Ideas on How to Do Well with Migrant Children’s 
Compulsory Education Further” in 2002, and “Ideas on Resolving Issues of 
Migrant Workers” in 2006. 105   These directives all share the same 
sentiment—that migrant children are entitled to nine years of compulsory 
education and that local governments need to take responsibility for 
educating the migrant children who live within their jurisdictions.106  The 
2006 directive explicitly denounces the practice of charging additional 
enrollment fees for migrant students in public schools, but mentions no 
penalties for noncompliance.107   
 While these directives represent high aspirations, they were largely 
ineffective in granting migrant children access to urban public schools.  
Local governments often interpreted these vague directives in ways that 
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minimized their responsibility for educating migrant children or ignored 
them altogether.108  Further, the directives did not include funding, likely 
making the State Council’s goals impracticable.109  
B. The Compulsory Education Act Provided Migrant Children More 
Protection on Paper, but Has Not Significantly Improved Access to 
State Schools 
The Compulsory Education Act (“CEA”) was adopted in 1986 and 
established a compulsory education system composed of primary and junior 
secondary education.110  According to the CEA, all Chinese children of the 
requisite age are entitled to nine years of compulsory education.111  Article 2 
of the CEA provides that “[n]o tuition or miscellaneous fees may be charged 
in the implementation of compulsory education” and that “[t]he State shall 
establish a guarantee mechanism for operating funds for compulsory 
education, in order to ensure implementation of the system of compulsory 
education.”112 
The CEA was amended in 2006 to better address the needs of migrant 
children.113  Specifically, the amendment “stipulates that when both parents 
or legal guardians are migrant workers living and working with their 
children in locations other than where the family is registered, local 
governments where they live and work must provide for the child's 
education.”114  Article 12 of the revised CEA reads, 
For school-age children and juveniles [sic] whose parents are 
working or dwelling at a place other than their permanent 
residence, if he/she receives compulsory education at the places 
where his/her parents or other statutory guardians are working 
or dwelling, the local people’s governments shall provide 
him/her with equal conditions for receiving compulsory 
education.115  
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Riding the trend of decentralization, Article 12 leaves implementation 
to local governments.116  The provision goes on to say that “[t]he 
concrete measures shall be formulated by provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government.”117   
The language in amended Article 12 still permits local 
governments to attach conditions to enrollment in compulsory 
education institutions that many migrant workers cannot satisfy.  For 
example, some local governments enforce rules to the effect that 
parents must establish local domicile before their child can be 
enrolled.118  Further, migrants are often still required to produce the 
“five certificates”:  temporary residence permits, work permits, proof 
of residence, certificates from the migrant’s place of origin, and 
household registration booklets.119  This continues despite a Human 
Rights Watch report that stated up to 90% of families are unable to 
obtain all of the five certificates.120  Further, due to overcrowding, 
urban schools frequently deny migrant workers the opportunity to 
enroll regardless of whether they satisfied the “five certificate” criteria, 
and enrolling in other public schools generally means they will need 
to pay even higher out-of-district fees.121  
C. Local Governments Have Too Much Power to Interpret National 
Education Laws and to Issue Their Own Education Regulations  
As a result of growing decentralization, local governments can use 
local regulations to defeat the purposes of laws and regulations from the 
central government. 122   Local governments can formulate more specific 
regulations that build on laws handed down from higher levels of 
government. 123   Chinese law scholars have gone so far as to call local 
regulations a weapon used to battle central government control.124  This 
disconnect between central government policies and local government 
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practices contributes to the predicament migrant children in Chinese cities 
face today.  
D. Discrimination Against Migrant Populations and Underfunding of 
Schools Perpetuates the Problems Migrant Children Have In 
Accessing Urban Public Schools 
Discrimination and underfunding at the local level, among other 
things, could explain why these accessibility problems persist despite the 
central government’s numerous attempts to incorporate migrant children into 
the public school system.  Migrant workers in Chinese cities are stigmatized, 
often portrayed by the media as “poor, dirty, ignorant and prone to 
violence.”125  Migrant workers also face undue blame for rising crime rates 
in cities, with “migrant crime” even considered a distinct category of 
criminal activity.126  Furthermore, despite the fact that cheap migrant labor is 
in high demand in Chinese cities, urban residents often view migrant 
workers as an unwanted drain on public resources.127  Such discrimination 
against the migrant community may help explain why local governments 
resist incorporating migrant children into their school systems.  
Discrimination is not the only reason local governments might want to 
limit access to local hukou holders.  Overcrowding already plagues many 
urban public schools. 128   If local school systems are operating at full 
capacity, there are few incentives for local government officials to open up 
schools to a flood of new children.  The combination of underfunding in 
urban schools and discrimination against migrants explains why local 
governments hesitate to incorporate migrant children into their public 
schools.   
E. Incorporating Migrant Children into the State School System Will 
Have Long Term Economic and Political Benefits for the Chinese 
Government  
Incorporating migrant children into the state school system will help 
accomplish some of the goals laid out in China’s 12th five-year plan, a list of 
the government’s current economic and social policy initiatives.  In this 
latest plan, the government declares its intention to boost service sector 
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value-added output, foster indigenous innovation, increase social harmony, 
and improve public services for urban and rural residents.129   
A significant number of migrant children live in China’s cities.  A 
study done in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, found that 36% of 
migrant workers living in the city moved with their children.130  Three broad 
categories of arguments—human rights, economics, and politics—illustrate 
why ignoring the educational needs of this population is both impractical 
and unwise. 
F. Compulsory Education Is a Human Right that Both Urban and Rural 
Migrant Populations Should Be Able to Access 
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to education.  Education shall be free, at least in 
the elementary and fundamental stages.  Elementary education shall be 
compulsory.”131  Today the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, is considered customary 
international law,132  meaning states comply with the norm because they 
believe it to have binding effects similar to any other law. 133   Migrant 
children are no less Chinese than their urban counterparts, and they deserve 
the same educational rights that the law guarantees to all Chinese children.  
Education is a powerful tool.  It gives children the means to improve their 
own lives and to make valuable contributions to China’s economy, culture, 
and society.134  Compulsory education should not be withheld from migrant 
children because of their parents’ inability to obtain urban hukou.  
Some may argue that children should be left at home where their 
hukou enables them to receive an education.  However, leaving children 
behind in rural villages is not always a viable option, particularly when there 
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is no one there to care for them.135  As discussed in Part II, many parents 
leave the rural villages they grew up in because of the poor infrastructure 
and lack of opportunity in these areas, hoping to share the promise of a 
better life in the city with their children.136   
Migrant parents who bring children to cities often work ten or more 
hours a day, seven days a week, which leaves little free time to spend with 
their children.137  If these children cannot attend school and are too young to 
work, few opportunities exist for them to cultivate useful skills (intellectual, 
interpersonal, and otherwise) that will make them productive citizens.  
Furthermore, exclusion from state schools perpetuates perceptions of 
inequality and discrimination that migrant children already feel, eroding 
their self-confidence and making it harder for them to adapt to city life.138  
Forcing migrant children to attend sub-par private institutions is not much 
better, as it still amounts to a type of socio-economic and cultural 
segregation139 that may further inflame cultural tensions between migrants 
and urban residents.  Migrant workers contribute heavily to urban 
development,140 and their children ought to receive the educational benefits 
of city living.   
G. China Will Experience Long-Term Economic Benefits as a Result of 
Incorporating Migrant Children into the State School System 
Renowned economist Friederich Hayek, analysts at the World Bank, 
and countless other scholars have documented education’s positive effects 
on economic growth.141  Incorporating migrant children into urban public 
schools will benefit China’s economy in several ways.  First, it will put more 
pressure on local governments to confront budgetary issues involved in the 
administration of compulsory education, which can cut down on waste.  
Second, small incentives like this will likely cause a modest uptick in rural-
urban migration, a benefit to local economies, without opening the 
floodgates and overwhelming urban infrastructure.  Upon moving to urban 
areas, rural residents typically do more economically productive work, make 
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more money, learn more skills, and purchase more goods than if they had 
remained at home.142  Simultaneously, their presence boosts the demand for 
urban infrastructure and housing, which can strengthen economic growth.143  
Lastly, educating this large group of children will benefit China in its 
transition to a service-based economy.   
Local governments tend to distribute resources to compulsory 
education based on the number of permanent residents residing within their 
jurisdictions as opposed to the actual number of school-age children living in 
the same area.144  This means that local governments do not need to take 
migrant children—even migrant children who have lived in the same cities 
since birth—into account when they disburse education funding.  Examined 
in another light, if these migrant children actually live in cities but their 
hukous still reflect rural residence, the local governments in their home 
villages are likely to be working with inaccurate numbers as well.  This 
creates a country-wide budgetary illusion—local governments in rural areas 
are budgeting for more children than actually attend their schools while local 
governments in urban areas are budgeting for far fewer children than are 
legally eligible to attend their schools.  The central government ought to 
make changes to the compulsory education funding system in order to make 
it more responsive to changing internal migration patterns, even if this 
means reining in the decentralization of education funding that has been 
occurring since the 1980s.  If local governments are forced to admit legally 
eligible children in their jurisdictions, it will put pressure on them to come to 
terms with this budgetary mess.  
 Incorporating the migrant student population into the state school 
system is in China’s economic self-interest and will yield short- and long-
term benefits.  First, doing so has the potential to increase migrant worker 
productivity.  Migrant workers with young children may not have as much 
time to dedicate to employment.  Compulsory education can provide dual 
functions of building intellectual capacity and serving as childcare for 
working parents.  Parents who have children enrolled in school experience 
better worker productivity, less absenteeism, and more focus on work-related 
tasks.145  Increased efficiency with respect to time allocation will bolster 
short-term economic growth.  
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Second, educating migrant children will build up China’s human 
capital in the long term.  Educated workers provide tangible assets in a 
service-based economy.  China’s recent minimum wage increases, some as 
high as 23%, suggest the country is slowly moving away from low-cost 
manufacturing, with foreign companies more frequently seeking out lower 
cost countries such as Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Vietnam.146  Studies have 
found that worker productivity is largely dependent on length and quality of 
education.147  Also, educationally acquired cognitive skills are essential for 
trainability and consequent skill achievements at work. 148   Individual 
cognitive skills have significant effects on individual earnings and 
countrywide economic growth. 149   China should adopt more inclusive 
educational policies, keeping in mind that education encourages 
metacognitive skills like problem solving and analysis, which are highly 
transferrable 150  and likely to be valuable in all stages of economic 
development.  Reforming the educational system will prepare Chinese 
citizens to enter the international service-based economy on equal footing 
with other countries. 
Third, providing compulsory education to migrant children will help 
ensure that the migrant workers who are essential to urban economies will 
stay and spend their money in the city instead of sending wages back to their 
home provinces.  Additionally, despite continued rural-urban migration, 
some cities are reporting labor shortages.151  Some migrant workers, in the 
face of rising inflation and institutional barriers such as hukou, are finding 
the costs of city living too high.152  In response there were country-wide 
minimum wage increases effective January 1, 2012 which indicate that 
China does not want migrant workers to return to their rural hometowns 
from urban industrial hubs.153  Large Chinese cities such as Beijing heavily 
value rural-urban migration because their economies depend on the 
continued availability of migrant labor.154  After all, migrant workers tend to 
perform menial but necessary jobs that city residents do not see as 
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desirable.155  Loosening hukou and “five certificate” based restrictions on the 
education of migrant children could become a small incentive that tips the 
balance in favor of city living once again, and may help ease the labor 
shortages some Chinese cities are beginning to report.156  Duan Chengrong, 
director of the Research Center for Population and Development at Renmin 
University, claims the hukou system has not stopped rural-urban migration; 
it has just meddled with urban labor markets.157  For urban areas to benefit 
from rural-urban migration, migration policies should be responsive to the 
needs of urban employers and not a culmination of arbitrary wealth and 
education requirements.  However, it should be noted that any loosening of 
hukou restrictions should be accompanied by proper funding and planning so 
that urban infrastructure will be able to accommodate the growing 
population.   
Fourth, incorporating migrant children into the state school system 
can reduce economic inequality, which many experts consider “a major 
stumbling block for domestic consumption to really take off in the long 
run.”
158
  Domestic consumption made up 51.6% of China’s growth in 2011, 
but its percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) pales in comparison to 
other developed economies.159  The recent economic slowdown in China, 
largely thought to be caused by weak export markets, is forcing the 
government to look to domestic consumption to take up the slack.160  By 
educating the large group of migrant children living in China’s cities, the 
government will be tackling economic inequality and paving the way for 
domestic consumption to grow in the long term.161 
Finally, incorporating migrant children into the state educational 
system would serve China’s goal of fostering more indigenous innovation.  
As China’s economy develops and labor costs continue to rise, low-cost 
manufacturing will drag down the country’s GDP.  This is because much of 
the technology manufactured in China was innovated and patented outside 
of the country, meaning Chinese manufacturers must pay royalties which 
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diminish their overall profits to foreign patent holders.162  Rising labor and 
commodities prices will also continue to shrink Chinese manufacturers’ 
profits.163  If the government prioritizes educating as many Chinese children 
as possible, it will effectively support the homegrown innovation that China 
desires.  
H. Incorporating Migrant Children into State Schools Will Have Political 
Benefits for the Chinese Communist Party by Soothing Social 
Tensions and Tackling Growing Income Inequality 
The Chinese government seeks to sustain the current trend of robust 
economic growth while maintaining domestic social stability.164  These goals 
are related, as domestic social stability creates a favorable environment for 
continued economic growth.165   
Education plays an important role in maintaining social stability 
because of its ability to teach not only traditional subjects like math and 
science, but also an increased tolerance for other cultures and alternative 
methods of dispute resolution.166  Education also has the potential to create a 
common value system shared across the populace.  Studies conducted in 
China have shown that poverty is related to under-development of 
educational infrastructure.167  Poorer areas with sub-par schools are more 
likely to experience rapid population growth, strained economic 
development, and ethnic tensions.168  Educating a person not only creates a 
foundation for advanced economic utility, but also encourages rational 
behavior and tolerance while discouraging fanaticism. 169   Education 
inculcates students with valuable market-applicable skills as well as skills 
that can be used to navigate the world around them in a tactful, non-
confrontational manner.   
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 Equal income distribution contributes to a country’s economic well-
being. 170   Scholars have observed that “[e]ven when there are tradeoffs 
between growth and equality in the short run, much . . . new research argues 
that attention to inequality can bring significant long-run benefits for overall 
economic growth.”171  Furthermore, recent case studies have shown that the 
presence of political, social, and economic inequality increases the 
likelihood of social unrest.172  In his 1999 speech to the World Bank, former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned of the dangers of 
horizontal inequality, a situation where “power and resources are unequally 
distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways—for 
instance by race, religion or language.”173  Horizontal inequality, measured 
by distribution of assets and education, is a significant cause of social 
unrest.174  Because migrant workers tend to be culturally distinct from other 
urban residents,175 this theory dictates that China is at risk of social unrest 
stemming from horizontal inequality.  Opening up state schools to migrant 
children is one method by which the government can tackle growing 
inequality and dampen social unrest in China.  
Many migrant workers already feel that the state mistreats them.176  
They report police discrimination, bureaucratic manipulation, and 
widespread corruption.177  For this population, a denial of access to social 
services where they live and work does not merely deprive them 
constitutional rights—it is often a matter of personal dignity. 178  
Furthermore, migrant workers feel the sting of income inequality.179  Today 
many migrant workers, instead of living in quaint rural villages with a small 
spectrum of socioeconomic status, live in cities amongst China’s emerging 
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middle and upper classes. 180   People assess their own well-being by 
comparing themselves with others, making relative measures of wealth and 
privilege just as important as absolute measures. 181   Although migrant 
workers tend to earn more money in cities than in their rural hometowns, 
living in cities lined with luxury boutiques and car dealerships surely 
sharpens their grievances.   
Perhaps more troubling for the Chinese government, this generation of 
migrant workers is more inclined to engage in collective action to demand 
their rights.182  Police mistreatment of a migrant worker in the summer of 
2011 caused large-scale riots in which angry mobs of migrant workers 
vandalized and torched traditional symbols of authority, such as government 
offices and police vehicles.183  During these riots a prominent government 
think-tank warned that if the huge population of migrant workers living in 
China’s cities was not treated more fairly, this population would create 
serious threat to domestic stability.184  
Migrant workers resent being looked down upon in the places where 
they work and live.  Some migrant workers have even reported an eagerness 
to find excuses to retaliate against the government.185  One area in which 
migrant discontent is visible is in education.  Because many migrant parents 
cannot enroll their children in their cities’ public schools, they sometimes 
turn to inferior private schools. 186   When these private schools are 
demolished—typically in the name of urban renewal or various code 
violations—many migrant parents see it as yet another form of 
discrimination.187  Many of these closures have been met with protests.188  
Some cities, such as Shanghai, attempt to alleviate tension by pairing these 
demolitions with openings in state schools for displaced children. 189  
However, for parents unable to gather the “five certificates” these openings 
may not actually mean their children can enroll in local public schools.  
Therefore these efforts do not succeed in appeasing all parents of ousted 
children.   
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Incorporating migrant children into the state school system would 
have several positive political effects on Chinese cities.  In the short term, 
migrant parents would have less reason to protest and disrupt social stability.  
Migrant children would also be given something productive to do during the 
day while their parents work.  In the long term, integration with local 
children, as opposed to segregation into sub-par private institutions, would 
build a sense of community that could eventually translate into less 
discrimination against the migrant population as a whole.  Chinese education 
scholars have noted that “[i]f educational credentials increasingly matter in 
the labor market and real opportunities for education are distributed 
equitably across social groups, this rising role of human capital in the labor 
market can be equalizing.”190  Educating migrant children will mean they 
have a better opportunity to join and contribute to China’s growing middle 
class instead of perpetuating the income inequality in China’s cities that is 
surely a recipe for domestic instability.  
IV. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD PASS NEW EDUCATION 
LEGISLATION, BOOST FUNDING, AND IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT 
 The central government must address several problems to make the 
wide-scale incorporation of migrant children into state schools a reality.  
First, the statutes and directives on the subject are drawn too broadly to be 
effective.  Second, urban schools already suffer from overcrowding and 
must somehow confront the addition of hundreds of migrant children.  
Finally, there are too few enforcement mechanisms to incentivize local 
governments to comply with existing laws and regulations.  Barring any 
significant changes to China’s socio-political structure, this Part suggests 
potential solutions that the central government could execute within the 
existing framework.  
A. The Central Government Should Further Amend the CEA to Prevent 
Local Governments from Requiring Unreasonable Documentation or 
Charging Extra Fees for Enrolling Migrant Children 
 In line with the purposes of the 2006 amendments to the Compulsory 
Education Act, Article 46 of the Chinese Constitution, and State Council 
directives over the past two decades, migrant children should not face 
unreasonable barriers to compulsory education.  Migrant children should not 
have to pay extra fees, nor should their parents need to present an unrealistic 
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array of documentation, for their children to receive public compulsory 
education.  Further amendments to the CEA should emphasize these policies 
in specific and binding language that should then be used in enforcement 
proceedings against noncompliant school districts.  Because local 
governments treat laws and regulations passed down by higher levels of 
government as a floor and not a ceiling,191 amendments must clearly and 
comprehensively protect migrant children’s right to education in order to be 
effective.  The amended CEA should also require the Ministry of Education 
to approve any student fees established by local school districts.  This would 
decrease the chances of local districts charging fees that theoretically would 
apply to the entire student body, but realistically only apply to migrant 
children, such as fees for not presenting the full “five certificates.”  
Violations should result in stiff financial penalties.  Legislation should also 
establish a specialized reporting system to allow migrant families to 
anonymously report non-compliant school districts to the Ministry of 
Education in an efficient manner.  Ideally this would result in targeted 
investigations into the practices of reported school districts while lowering 
the risk of retaliation against those who report violations.  
 Practical concerns indicate that China should maintain some form of 
documentary requirement, because allowing migrant children into state 
schools with no documentation at all could result in an administrative 
nightmare.  For example, parents passing through an urban center might 
enroll children in schools just to pull them out several weeks later, creating a 
disruptive learning environment.  Additionally, children might be able to 
attend schools in areas where their families do not actually live or work.  
However, the “five certificate” requirement unduly burdens migrant workers 
because it does not take into account the fact that many do not have formal 
housing or employment contracts and find it hard to establish even 
temporary residency because of the complicated and demanding government 
procedures involved.192  Again, reports estimate that 90% of migrant parents 
cannot acquire all of the “five certificates.”193  Parents should be able to 
prove, by whatever reasonable means possible, that they actually live in the 
district in which they plan to enroll their children.  Alternatives to the “five 
certificate system” include solutions such as presenting records of social 
security insurance payments, tax receipts, bills, or bank account statements.  
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Further, presenting formal housing contracts alone should sufficiently prove 
actual residence, but should not be the only acceptable means of proving 
actual residence.  In order to facilitate the transition to a new system in 
which parents can choose their own means of proving actual residence, the 
State Council should issue a detailed directive—or the Ministry of Education 
should enact a detailed regulation—clarifying the types of documentary 
evidence that constitute definitive proof of residency. 
B. The Central Government and Local Governments Should Allocate 
More Funding to Education 
 Securing more funding for education will not only effectively ensure 
future economic growth; it will also be politically popular because it aligns 
with China’s Confucian roots. 194   In the seventh book of the Analects, 
Confucius is quoted as saying, “I never refuse to teach anyone, not even 
those so lowly they come offering nothing more but a few strips of dried 
meat.”195  Though interpretations of this statement differ, modern scholars 
see this statement as an expression of support for fairness and 
nondiscrimination in education.196  Indeed, through most of its long history 
China has held scholars in high esteem.  The current government also seems 
to embrace Confucian ideals, as evidenced by the establishment of a global 
network of Confucius Institutes, tasked with promoting Mandarin dialects, 
Chinese culture, and Confucianism around the world.197   
Boosting education funding will also be politically popular because it 
will provide benefits to the population as a whole.  A 2010 survey conducted 
by the All-China Women’s Federation found that the rising cost of education 
was the number one source of familial conflict among those surveyed.198  
The central government could simultaneously alleviate countrywide familial 
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stress and improve migrant children’s access to public schools by increasing 
appropriations to lessen students’ tuition and miscellaneous fees.  
 China spends significantly less on education than most other middle-
income countries.  China spent 2.1% of its gross domestic product (“GDP”) 
on education in 2011.199  In contrast, the United States spent 5.7% of its 
GDP on education in 2011.200  Even compared to the world’s other three 
major emergent (“BRIC”) countries, China’s education spending is on the 
low side of the spectrum.  In 2011 India spent 4.1%,201 Russia spent 3.1%,202 
and Brazil spent 4.3% of its GDP on education.203  China should allocate 
more funding to education not only to uphold the constitutional rights of 
migrant children, but also because it is a sound economic investment with 
the potential to bring greater social stability to urban areas.  
Precedent exists for central and local government collaboration on 
educational initiatives.  In 2005, the central government and several 
provincial governments cooperated on a project called “two frees, one 
subsidy” where they jointly invested 7.2 billion yuan (approximately $1.14 
billion USD) to improve access to compulsory education in impoverished 
rural areas.204  The subsidies helped cover the cost of attendance fees and 
textbooks, among other things, for poor rural families.205  Collaborations of 
this sort will benefit central and local governments because they will both 
enjoy the economic payoffs of such educational investments. 
In China, investments in education produce dramatic returns, 
especially in urban areas. 206   Chengdu, the bustling capital of Sichuan 
Province, has invested significant funds recruiting quality teachers and 
building new schools in the villages and towns surrounding the city. 207  
Chengdu’s mayor, Ge Hongling, claims this effort has narrowed the urban-
rural income gap, encouraged overall economic growth, and curbed some of 
the problems associated with mass urban-rural migration.208   
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Successful compliance with compulsory education laws will require 
investment in three key arenas:  urban schools, rural schools, and wider 
enforcement of education laws and prosecution of violators.  First, urban 
schools must be physically able to accommodate incoming migrant children.  
This means more classrooms, more educational materials, and more 
teachers.  Creating more space reduces incentives for school administrators 
to sell off open slots to the highest bidder.  Second, rural schools need better 
funding so that migrant parents feel more comfortable leaving children in 
their hometowns to be educated.  This will not only benefit rural villages by 
creating more jobs and building more human capital, but will also ease the 
pressure on urban schools.  Finally, the central government must allocate 
funds for on-the-ground, periodic enforcement of compulsory education 
laws.  
C. The Central Government and Local Governments Need to Increase 
Enforcement of Relevant Laws on Educating Migrant Children 
 Although the amendments to the Compulsory Education Act and the 
relevant State Council directives spell out a clear purpose—to fully 
incorporate migrant children into the state school system—local 
governments have found numerous ways around these measures.209  As the 
ancient Chinese proverb goes, “the mountains are high and the Emperor is 
far away.”210  Increased enforcement of compulsory education laws, coupled 
with meaningful punishment of violators, will make the costs of non-
compliance higher for local governments that were not previously 
incentivized to incorporate migrant children into the public school system. 
 The Standing Committee of the NPC has the constitutional right to 
interpret China’s Constitution and statutes.211  It may also “annul those local 
regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government that contravene the Constitution, the statutes or the 
administrative rules and regulations.”212  The Standing Committee should 
use its constitutional powers to annul local regulations that interfere with the 
goal of full integration and make serious efforts to ensure that such 
annulments are heeded in practice, perhaps with the Ministry of Education’s 
assistance.  Without real enforcement or stiff penalties for non-compliance, 
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local governments could simply find ways around any new legislation 
enacted to protect the educational rights of migrant children in their 
jurisdictions.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 There is no doubt that China knows how to educate children.  In 2009 
China participated alongside sixty-five other counties in the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (“PISA”), a test that evaluates worldwide 
educational systems by testing random samples of fifteen-year-old 
students.213  In this round of testing, Shanghai had the highest average test 
scores, beating out countries like the United States, Japan, and Germany.214  
If the political willpower existed, China could use widespread education as a 
tool to seamlessly transition from a country of manufacturers to a country of 
innovators.  
Moreover, the effective denial of compulsory education to the 
children of migrant workers living in China’s cities is an unwise policy 
choice for Chinese leaders.  Incorporating migrant children into state schools 
will help to soothe tensions between migrant workers and local residents by 
building a sense of community and correcting the wide income distribution 
between the two groups.  This comment noted that Chinese cities heavily 
depend on migrant labor.215  If the administrative barriers to life in the city 
remain overly burdensome, migrant workers that otherwise add value to 
urban economies may choose to stay home, exacerbating labor shortages that 
Chinese cities have begun reporting.216   
The central government is taking some positive steps to address the 
social problems caused by the hukou system.  A recent State Council circular 
introduced a new policy whereby acquisition of urban hukou in small and 
medium sized cities would be easier for applicants with stable jobs and 
residences, provided they have paid social security insurance for at least one 
year.217  Under this policy, migrant parents could also apply for urban hukou 
on behalf of their unmarried children. 218   If this policy is earnestly 
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implemented at the local government level, it could pave the way to more 
inclusive urban public schools.  However, this new policy does not address 
the problems faced by migrant families living in major cities like Shanghai 
and Beijing.  
 China wishes to continue its robust economic growth while 
maintaining domestic social stability.219  As the country departs from the 
low-cost manufacturing model, the government needs to invest in the 
creation of more human capital in order to compete with other service-based 
economies on the global stage. 220   Educating the tens of thousands of 
migrant children with no current access to the state school system221 is not 
only a means to this end, it is a moral imperative.  
 
                                                      
219
 Key Targets of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, supra note 129.  
220
 SOUBBOTINA, supra note 16.  
221
 Weihua, supra note 81.  
